Property

This essay is a partial refutation and partial expansion of John Locke's philosophical theory of property as expressed in his Second Treatise on Government. This theory has been enormously influential on political thinkers after him, especially conservatives, who often quote his definition, "The labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his." But this is more a definition of how we obtain property than what property really is, and it does not adequately justify ownership of objects which are not the work of man's hands, such as land and raw materials from the earth. While Locke has paved his road with very good intentions, he is not always careful about the rigorousness of his logic or the solidity of his assumptions, and so occasionally goes astray, and I believe this definition of property is one which has fallen short of the truth. In fairness to Locke, I will attempt to briefly summarize his logical path to this definition of property, and then follow a similar path until it diverges, leading up to a conclusion in which we will see that sound logic leads to a definition of property which is more akin to stewardship than that definition given by Locke.

John Locke's analysis of property

(The section references are all from Chapter V, "Of Property," of Locke's Second Treatise on Government.)

Locke starts with his Natural Law, according to which all things are at the beginning held in common by all mankind, for the support and comfort of their being. (sec. 25)

Next, he notes that the food we eat must be ours, because it becomes a part of us. (sec. 26)  For "every man has a property in his own person." (sec. 27)  Therefore those things are appropriated to ourselves out of the common stock and become our property.  This process of appropriation is labor: "labor put a distinction between them and common" (sec. 28).

He asserts that labor creates property, by the implicit common consent of all mankind (sec. 28-29), because we all have a right to "preservation, and consequently to meat and drink" (sec. 25) and other necessities for our support and comfort.

There is a limit to how much one may take from the common stock.  "As much as any one can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils, so much he may by his Tabour fix a property in: whatever is beyond this, is more than his share, and belongs to others. Nothing was made by God for man to spoil or destroy." (sec. 31)

Land is not a product of labor, so how is land justified as property?  "As much land as a man tills, plants, improves, cultivates, and can use the product of, so much is his property." (sec. 32)  He affirms that there is enough land for everyone to have sufficient for his own use. (sec. 36) Improving the land enriches all mankind. "And therefore he that incloses land, and has a greater plenty of the conveniences of life from ten acres, than he could have from an hundred left to nature, may truly be said to give ninety acres to mankind" (sec. 37).  Beyond that, the improvements are worth more than the land itself: "the improvement of labour makes the far greater part of the value." (sec. 40)

The things most useful to the life of man are generally perishable.  Everyone has a right to as much as he can productively use, but not to take in excess and allow it to spoil lest others not also have enough (sec. 46).  But trade is also productive, allowing others to mutually benefit from each other's labor.  He may also trade for more durable, rare, and valuable things variously known as money.  "The exceeding of the bounds of his just property not lying in the largeness of his possession, but the perishing of any thing uselessly in it." (sec. 46)

Money thus arises as a durable and valuable commodity.  Although it "has its value only from the consent of men" (sec. 50), by mutual consent men would take it in exchange for the truly useful but perishable supports of life. (sec. 47)  And as different degrees of industry were apt to give men possessions in different proportions, so this invention of money gave them the opportunity to continue and enlarge them. (sec. 48)  "It is plain, that men have agreed to a disproportionate and unequal possession of the earth, they having, by a tacit and voluntary consent, found out a way how a man may fairly possess more land than he himself can use the product of, by receiving in exchange for the overplus gold and silver, which may be hoarded up without injury to any one." (sec. 50)

These are the strongest arguments I can extract from Locke in support of property.  But in so doing I have omitted many fallacious arguments and even Locke's own observations which weaken and contradict his thesis.

An alternate analysis of Property

Definition

Property (m-w.com): a : something owned or possessed; specifically : a piece of real estate b : the exclusive right to possess, enjoy, and dispose of a thing : ownership c : something to which a person or business has a legal title

The essential aspect of property is ownership.

Ownership (m-w.com): a : to have or hold as property : possess b : to have power or mastery over

Thus, property is that which we have control over.  (or power over, mastery of, etc.)

wikipedia: Property (or owndom) is any physical or intangible entity that is owned by a person or jointly by a group of people or a legal entity like a corporation. Depending on the nature of the property, an owner of property has the right to consume, sell, rent, mortgage, transfer, exchange or destroy it, or to exclude others from doing these things.

Two Laws

It will be useful to first note that Locke's so-called "natural law" is actually better described by a different term he often uses for it: "the law of reason".  There is another natural law, which I shall call the primitive natural law, which exists in the state of nature, among most wild animals and also among wicked men.  This primitive law is the survival of the fittest, or that the strongest should rule over the weaker by virtue of their own strength.

The Law of Reason teaches, as Locke says, that all men enjoy the same natural rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and that their right to liberty only extends to far that it does not encroach upon another's right to the same things. This law is easily discovered by all men of reason and logic, as are the duties that its reciprocality imposes upon them.  And it is also taught to all men by God ("Love thy neighbor as thyself").

These two laws are two different axioms upon which a logically consistent "morality" can be built.  They do not directly contradict one another, but one is a higher (or more divine, or good) law than the other.  When one rejects or ceases to follow the dictates of the law of reason, he falls under the lower, primitive law, and must also suffer its consequences if his strength is not sufficient to protect himself.  "For all they that take the sword shall perish with the sword." (Matt 26:52)  "And he who cannot abide the law of a terrestrial kingdom cannot abide a terrestrial glory." (D&C 88:23)

The primitive law is the law of force and fear.  The law of reason is the law of duty.  There exists another even higher law, the law of love, of which we know relatively few details, we being not yet worthy or ready to receive and live it.  For how can we be asked to live the law of love when we as yet struggle with the simple self-evident law of duty?  "I have fed you with milk, and not with meat: for hitherto ye were not able to bear it, neither yet now are ye able." (1 Cor 3:2)

Property under the Primitive Law

If there is any material thing at all which can be called property, or that which we possess and have exclusive control over, our own body must be our own property, before all else.  It is evident, even under the primitive law, that we have first and foremost claim to it, and that if we lose it (i.e. die), all other property is also forfeit.

Secondly, we have control over that which we currently hold, and this control represents a claim of possession or property.  This is evident even to the lower animals and to the undeveloped minds of small children. 

Thirdly, we attempt to extend our claim of control and property over a greater amount and area, by the use of fences, houses, locks, signs, and a great variety of other defenses, signals, communications, and agreements, lest by any chance the mere relinquishing of immediate physical possession be interpreted as a relinquishing of the claim of property as well.  It is all an elaborate dance to try to defeat the primitive law of property, succinctly expressed as "finders, keepers!"

Property is obtained under the primitive law of force by claim and by conquest.  A claim to possession is all that is needed to legitimize property, and disputed claims are decided by contest, in which the stronger in battle, or more clever in exploiting society's customs wins his claim by right of conquest.  Should fairness, need, agreements, or charity come into the question, one is in danger of living by a higher law.

It is important to understand the workings of property under the primitive law, even when our object is to study the higher law of reason, in order that we may recognize when our logic or instincts threaten to drag us down to the lower law, which is always a temptation when dealing with physical wealth.

Property is not self-evident

The right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness are self-evident on a very basic level.  Should anyone dispute that every man has a right to one of them, we need only ask the claimant whether he is himself willing to surrender that right.  For this reciprocity is the fundamental axiom of the law of reason and duty.  If he surrenders his life or liberty, he no longer has the ability or right to make the claim, and who would heed any claim from one who is so unwise as to be evidently miserable himself?

The argument for property is not so simple.  The child, the aesthetic, the monk, the socialist, these all make the claim to not need individual property, and even to be happier without it.  The Son of Man himself had not where to lay his head, so we may even question the utility of property under the highest law of love.  Nevertheless, under the law of duty, the vast majority have need of property, at least as a means to the end of pursuing their own happiness, so we must examine its foundations and justifications under that law.

A right of property must exist

That our own bodies are our property is also true under the law of reason, both by the simple fact that we do indeed have exclusive control over it, so long as it remains able to function, and by the self-evident right to life.

That other things must also come to be our property is also true, by the argument given by Locke concerning the ingestion of food.  That which we eat becomes a part of our body, and therefore our property.  When it was outside of us, its ownership was not so clear, for another could have picked it up and eaten it instead.  So somewhere a process of appropriation must have occurred to make it our property. 

Of non-property

That which is not our property must be in some other state.  Since it is evident that not every item in the world is under the direct control of some human, those things which are not the immediate and obvious property of someone are either the property of no one, or are considered the common property of all.  If one's body is obviously one's own, then the lion also belongs to the lion, the plant to the plant, and so on, to the extent that each being can exercise free will.  However, it must be acknowledged that mankind rules over these all.  And this is shown either as a decree from God, as Locke acknowledges that God has given all things to man; or by right of conquest, for man's mind has raised him over all other creatures in dominion. 

It is justly asked how a man, living under the law of reason, giving to all men the right of liberty, can thus deny the same right to lesser creatures.  But all these have not the gift of reason, which is the minimum requirement whereby they might also acknowledge and live the law of reason and duty.  So they live by the primitive law of force, and must also be ruled by that same law.  When dealing with animals, we are forced to use the law of force to some extent, because that is the only way they can deal with us.  So long as man abides the law of duty, the lesser creatures will benefit by the balance and harmony which duty proscribes upon man's decrees, of which I will have more to say later.

There is also the argument of physical necessity, for no man or creature can live at all without destroying another lesser creature, and no one will deny his need to live at the expense of those creatures in the lower kingdom of plants.  But how far this right or necessity extends upward into the kingdom of animals is a deep question and beyond the scope of our current inquiry.

Now since man has dominion over all the earth, it must be acknowledged that he also has claim to it as property, and that as common property to all.  For on the one hand, God has granted the Earth to Adam and to all his posterity equally, he being no respecter of persons, nor did he institute a hereditary kingship among them until they rejected him as their king. (Sam 8:7; Locke's assumption of the hereditary right of kingship is a mistake, but there is not room here to correct all his errors.)  Furthermore, it is not the deeds of any man which raised mankind to dominion, but the traits common to all, and the cooperative society and laws under which he lives.

The appropriation of property

I agree with Locke that the earth is in the beginning the common property of all.  (See also D&C 59:16-20)  Since man seeks to live by the law of reason and each man therefore has equal claim to that which is common to all, the appropriation of goods from the common stock can only be by the common consent of all.  This common consent cannot be explicit, as by a vote, for that would be impractical, as Locke says.  But implicit common consent can be granted if and only if the actions involved can satisfy the categorical imperative of Kant: "Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law without contradiction."  That is, one may appropriate property out of the common stock if he can likewise allow all men to do the same as he does.

Some may ask whether it is even possible to satisfy the categorical imperative, for while Locke affirms that the earth has plenty to satisfy the needs of even twice the population of his time, we now have ten times his population upon the earth.  But God himself has affirmed this same thing to us: "The earth is full, and there is enough and to spare." (D&C 104:17)

This principle confirms many of the limitations which Locke places on the appropriation of property, that things should not be taken merely to decay and spoil while in our possession, that one not take more than is needed, and that one leave enough and as good for others.  It also confirms some of Locke's excesses, for if a man gives back to the common good more that he takes, how can this be disparaged?  These principles can be applied universally without contradiction, so they are true maxims satisfying the categorical imperative.

But not all of Locke's assumptions and conclusions can be agreed with.  For he says, "that men, being once born, have a right to their preservation, and consequently to meat and drink, and such other things as nature affords for their subsistence."  If men have a right to such things, they may also have a right to education, housing, internet access, sanitation, healthcare, collective bargaining, social security, freedom from fear and want, electricity, vaccination, dignified work, marijuana, and every other ridiculous "right" one can think of.  And who is to provide it?  Do they have a right to food and drink in winter when nature provides no such thing?  On the contrary, it was God's decree, that "in the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread, till thou return unto the ground." (Gen 3:19)  It may be more correct to say that food and drink is not a natural right, but a natural necessity, and this necessity impels us to labor for our own support.  Pure reason has no inherent needs or motivations.  Our motivations are provided through our physical needs, which must be governed by reason.

Now it is just to assign to man ownership of the works of his own hands, and Locke makes this the central and defining principle of his analysis of property. "The labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his." (sec. 27) But this alone cannot legitimize all types of property, for land and the raw materials of nature are not the work of his hands, so he must extend the definition. "Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property." (sec. 27) And extend it again: "As much land as a man tills, plants, improves, cultivates, and can use the product of, so much is his property." (sec. 32) And more brazenly, "the improvement of labour makes the far greater part of the value." (sec. 40) So that one is led inexorably to the conclusion that a claim for better and more productive use of land must take precedence over a less productive claim for fruits of the land, as he indeed does for the land in America, Africa, and elsewhere, "the inhabitants thereof not having joined with the rest of mankind, in the consent of the use of their common money." (sec. 45) But this is the primitive law of force. Locke's line of reasoning has led him to abandon the basic moral principle of reciprocality, and thence downwards to the lower law, rather than pointing men upwards to the higher law of reason.

Stewardship

I agree with Locke that man has a right to the ownership of the work of his own hands, but rather than extending that definition in order to legitimize the appropriation of the common stock, I acknowledge that every work of a man's hand has in it something taken from the common stock. All property is a combination of our own labor, and of raw materials taken from nature or from the labor of others. We add value through our labor, but the materials already had an intrinsic value.

One way to measure and exchange that value is via money. But this is not the only way, nor always the best way, for when money is seen as the ultimate measure of value, it easily becomes the end in itself, and much of that which it was invented to measure is forgotten. Locke himself illustrates this fatal fallacy when he justifies forcible appropriation of land from native cultures who do not participate in the use of the white man's form of money.

That which is valuable is valuable because of the benefit it provides to men, whether for the immediate sustaining of life, or for the improvement of quality of life though comfort, convenience, enjoyment, and so forth. The ultimate valuation of any thing is in how much it benefits individual men and mankind in general. (Although I use the term "common good of all mankind" in my thesis, I recognize that while such a collective concept may be measurable in a collective sense, it can only be achieved by raising the level of good in each member of the collective individually.)

Therefore, in taking from the common stock of all mankind, for his food, support, and the raw materials of his work, every man incurs a debt to the common good of all mankind.  God did not place Adam and his posterity on the earth as sovereign kings answerable to no one, but as stewards with all the authority of kings, and answerable to the true king, God himself.

Applications of Stewardship

We must here also acknowledge the principle of liberty, and of the free will which is so fundamental to Kant's analysis of morality, and to God's purposes in placing man on the earth.  By saying that although we take from the common stock, we yet owe a debt to something different, the common good, I hope to emphasize that this debt is not to be repaid in kind, or by replacing exactly what was taken.  Instead, I assert that man has the capacity to improve by his industry that which he takes from nature or the common stock, and he also has the responsibility to give back something better and more valuable that what he takes, that the good of all mankind may be increased thereby.  He has liberty to determine for himself the manner and material of his gifts (D&C 58:26-28), and he also has a right to profit for himself from his own labor. 

Therefore I conclude that the true principle governing the ownership of property is stewardship.  Stewardship means that every time we exercise our right to own property we also incur a responsibility to use it wisely.  Though our liberty gives us the right of absolute control over our property, and to profit from it, we must always consider ourselves answerable to God or to the common good of mankind for the uses we make of our property.  For if we cannot make an argument justifying that our possessing of something improves the common good, the categorical imperative cannot justify our possession of it.

Yet while the need to justify ourselves is stated in the strongest terms to emphasize its importance, one must acknowledge that, like the need of common consent for appropriation of goods, this justification is often more implicit than explicit, for it is not necessary or practical to justify oneself to everyone individually, any more that one may be expected to obtain the consent of everyone for each apple he plucks from a tree.  We may perhaps best justify ourselves by dealing justly and equitably with each person we meet (for "by their fruits ye shall know them") and also by treating each person as an end in themselves, and never as a means to some other end.

Stewardship can also justify (and indeed much better than Locke's money) the right to grow wealthy, if that wealth is also being used wisely, according to one's best abilities, to improve the common good of all mankind.  It is also evident that the wealthier one becomes, that very gap between one's own wealth and that of the common man, demands a greater and more obvious justification that one is indeed giving back more value than one takes, rather than falling back to the primitive law and living by one's accumulated strength at the expense of the weaker common people.  It also legitimizes and even demands that if one appears to be abusing his riches or power, that the common people should protest the perceived abuses, that thereby he be tested whether he does indeed live by the higher law demanding stewardship or whether the greed for gain has tempted him downward to the lower law where every man conquers according to his strength. 

When dealing with other men, we are morally obligated to act according to the law of duty, because they have the capacity to live that law, whether they choose to or not.  No one can be forced to live the law of duty, because that would be force, not duty.  Duty must come from inside, and can be reasoned, taught, persuaded, and preached, but never forced.  The only exception we are allowed is when someone exercises force on us, and we may reciprocate in self-defense.  In such situations, when the laws of force and duty are put at odds because someone chooses not to follow the law of duty, we have to find a way to resolve the situation, and I call that process "Justice."  Locke actually outlines the boundaries of Justice well, saying that we may only exercise force after a crime against another's rights has been committed, and only for the purposes/punishment of appropriate restitution and prevention. 

Thus, even when a rich man abuses his power and clearly lives by the law of force, returning nothing to the common good of his fellow man, no one is justified in taking his riches by force, unless he transgresses the established law of the land.  But we should not ever despair of the efficaciousness of reasoning, teaching, persuading, and preaching the responsibilities of duty, for as young men feel a natural inclination to conquer and build their empire, even so older men sense the futility of endless expansion and feel a natural inclination to work for the benefit of something larger than themselves.  And this they will do, if virtuous teachings and examples of duty have been placed before them.